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NOTES AND COMMENTS
TRADE REGULATION: MARY CARTER PAINT CO.
v. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
Mary Carter Paint Company marketed its product by advertising that
with every can of paint sold, another of like amount would be given
free. This was done through the media of newspapers, magazines, radio
and television using such phrases as "Buy Only Half the Paint You
Need," "Every Second Can Free of Extra Cost,' and "Buy 1 and get 1
Free." 1
In 1961 a complaint was issued by the Federal Trade Commission
against Mary Carter alleging that these advertising practices were "false,
misleading and deceptive." 2 The hearing examiner in his initial decision
found that the statements were deceptive, and he stated:
In truth and in fact, the usual and customary retail price of each
can of Mary Carter paint was not, and is not now, the price
designated in the advertisement but was, and is now, sub-
stantially less than such price. The second can of paint was
not, and is not now, "free," that is, was not, and is not now,
given as a gift or gratuity. The offer is on the contrary, an
offer of two cans of paint for the price avertised as or pur-
porting to be the list price or customary and usual price of one
can.3
The initial decision of the hearing examiner substantially reflected the
opinion of the Commission, and Mary Carter was ordered to ". .. cease
and desist from representing, directly or by implication .. . (b) That
any article of merchandise is being given free or as a gift, or without
cost or charge, when such is not the fact.... 4
Mary Carter appealed the decision of the Federal Trade Commission
to the United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.5 After reviewing the
decision of the Commission, the court set aside the cease and desist order
on the grounds that it lacked the precision and definiteness required
of such an order, and that the advertising was not deceptive.6 In its
opinion the court said: "The evidence presented no conflict which would
form the basis of such a finding [by the Commission], and the sole ques-
tion presented here is a question of law for the court, whether the Com-
mission's conclusions from the undisputed facts are legally supportable." '
The decision of the circuit court was appealed to the United States
Supreme Court, and certiorari was granted.8 On November 8, 1965, the
I In the Matter of Mary Carter Paint Company, 60 F.T.C. 1827, 1830-31
(1962).
2 In the Matter of Mary Carter Paint Company, 60 F.T.C. 1827, 1829 (1962).
3 In the Matter of Mary Carter Paint Company, 60 F.T.C. 1827, 1844 (1962).
4 In the Matter of Mary Carter Paint Company, 60 F.T.C. 1827, 1845 (1962).5 Mary Carter Paint Co. v. FTC, 333 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1964).
6 Iid.
7 Id. at 659. (Emphasis by court.)
8FTC v. Mary Carter Paint Co., 379 U.S. 957 (1965).
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Supreme Court reversed the decision of the circuit court and remanded
the case to the Federal Trade Commission by its own suggestion, for
clarification. 9 The need for clarity in orders was expressed in FTC v.
Henry Broch & Co., wherein it was stated:
The severity of possible penalties prescribed by the amendments
for violations of orders which have become final underlies the
necessity for fashioning orders which are, at the outset, suffi-
ciently clear and precise to avoid raising serious questions as
to their meaning and application.10
In the instant case the Supreme Court in its opinion said: "... [It is
arguable that any deception was limited to representation that Mary
Carter has a usual and customary price for single cans of paint, when
it has no such price. However, it is not for courts to say whether this
violates the act." Here the Court has reached the crux of the problem and
decided that the circuit court acted outside its authority in overruling
the Commission's decision that Mary Carter's practices were deceptive.
The Federal Trade Commission derives its power to regulate adver-
tising in interstate commerce from the Federal Trade Commission Act
of 1914.12 The act states: "The Commission is empowered and directed to
prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations.. . from using unfair meth-
ods of competition in commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in
commerce." 13 The Commission is further directed that, after a proper
hearing, if it finds the practices in question to be in violation of the Act,
it shall issue an order requiring those practices to be ceased. 14 The func-
tions of the Commission have been said to be both quasi legislative and
quasi judicial. Mr. Justice Sutherland in Humphrey's Executor v. United
States 15 expressed his opinion that the Commission is an administrative
body created by Congress to carry into effect legislative policies embodied
in the statute in accordance with the prescribed legislative standard, and
to perform other specified duties as a legislative or as a judicial aid. The
avowed purpose of creating the Commission to hear these cases was to pro-
vide ". . . a body specially competent to deal with them by reason of
information, experience and careful study of the business and economic
conditions of the industry affected.. ." and was organized in a manner
which would ". . . give to them an opportunity to acquire the expertness
in dealing with these special questions concerning industry that comes
from experience . ..
Since the Commission is a body with a peculiar expertise in this area,
9 FTC v. Mary Carter Paint Co., 86 S.Ct. 219 (1965).10368 U.S. 360, 367-68 (1962).
1F FTC v. Mary Carter Paint Co., supra note 9, at 221. (Emphasis added.)
12 15 U.S.C. S 41.
13 15 U.S.C. 45 (a) (6).
1415 U.S.C. 5 45(b).
25295 U.S. 602 (1935).
165. REp. No. 597, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 9, 11 (1914).
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much weight is given to its decisionsyt The theory is that the members
of the Commission have dealt with one specific area of conflict and are
familiar with the problems involved and suitably equipped to arrive at
a proper solution.
This being the avowed purpose of the Congress in creating the Com-
mission, it is apparent that the Commission is to decide, based on its
knowledge of like or similar situations, which cases violate the terms of
the Act. In so doing, the Commission is placed in the position of making
a determination of the facts of the case and deciding whether they fall
within the Act as set forth by the Congress and interpreted by the courts.' 8
This determination is within the Commission's province and cannot be
altered by the courts unless certain elements are present. The court
reviewing a determination or judgment which an administrative agency
alone is authorized to make cannot affirm the administrative action by
substituting what it considers to be a more adequate or proper basis. If
it did so, it would invade the domain which Congress has set aside exclu-
sively for the administrative agency.' 9
In the instant case the Supreme Court has limited the scope of review
of decisions of the Federal Trade Commission to a determination of
whether the decision was (1) arbitrary or (2) dearly wrong.2 The cir-
cuit court opinion was not aimed at deciding if the Commissions deci-
sion fell within these limits, but was, for the most part, a reiteration of
the opinion of a dissenting commissioner. The Fifth Circuit Court seems
to be displeased with the present function of administrative agencies. This
displeasure is reflected in such statements as "... . the Commission, in
reaching its conclusion, had devoted its efforts to tithing mint, anise and
cummin, while neglecting the weightier things of the law." 21
The circuit court opinion was not limited to a discussion of whether
the Commission stayed within its proper bounds, but instead substituted
the court's conclusions for those of the Commission. It stated that Mary
Carter should have been able to rely on a previous Commission opinion
which the court felt was on point and coincided with its view. 22 This
whole approach is clearly in conflict with the opinion of Mr. Justice
Brandeis in Virginia Ry. v. United States, wherein he stated: "... to con-
sider the weight of the evidence before the Commission, the soundess of
the reasoning by which its conclusions were reached, or whether the find-
17 "While this court has declared that it is for the courts to determine what
practices or methods of competition are to be deemed unfair . . .in passing on
that question the determination of the Commission is of weight." FTC v. R. F.
Keppel & Bro. Inc., 291 U.S. 304, 314 (1934).
'8 FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421 (1919).
19 SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1946).20 
"There was substantial evidence in the record to support the Commission's
finding; its determination that the practice here was deceptive was neither arbi-
trary nor clearly wrong." FTC v. Mary Carter Paint Co., supra note 9, at 221.1Mary Carter Paint Co. v. FTC, supra note 5, 657.
22 In the matter of Walter J. Black, 50 F.T.C. 225 (1953).
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